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Musical Skills
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A recent paradigm shift in music research has allowed scholars to examine the
macro- and micro-processes taking place within musical performance and underlying
cognitive processes. Tying in with phenomenological theories of embodied perception
and cognition, this paper focuses on bodily musical activity relevant to the acquisition
of instrumental musical skills – the process of learning music. Dynamic interaction with
musical instruments, accompanied by the interplay of action and passion, involves body
image and body schema, whose status oscillates in different phases of the acquisition
of instrumental musical skills; this interaction allows humans to direct attention from their
bodily states – the proximal – to the quality of musical sounds and a unity of musical
experience – the distal. It is thus argued that shaping music by means of playing a
musical instrument can be conceived of as an embodied process, of understanding the
forms of one’s own experience as related to the musical world that is created by one’s
bodily activity.
Keywords: action/passion, corporeality, body image, body schema, embodiment, existential feelings,
instrumental musical skills, proximal/distal
INTRODUCTION
Most acts of playing a musical instrument involve bodily activity based on diverse instrumental
techniques; these in turn depend on the affordances and constraints that the musical instrument
provides (Reybrouck, 2012; Altavilla et al., 2013; Krueger, 2014), and which the player perceives as
such. Efforts to produce sounds effectively and refine one’s control of sound qualities (e.g., timbre)
are a basis for the acquisition of instrumental musical skills – that can involve highly sophisticated
bodily activity – even in the case of a digital instrument, enhanced with gestural interfaces (Ryan,
1992). Moreover, bodily activity based on instrumental musical skills which serve to generate
and control sound can be characterized as “musical,” in the sense that it has an affinity to the
characteristics of the perceptible musical sounds (e.g., duration, contour, and tension/relaxation)
that it generates and shapes.
The acquisition of instrumental musical skills is not only relevant to professional musicians, but
to every human being who strives for bodily activity dealing with sound in those extra-ordinary
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contexts (Dissanayake, 1992) where, unlike interaction in
language, the activity is not necessarily directed toward a clear
goal to be achieved (Cross, 2014). The acquisition of instrumental
musical skills is therefore a subject both for the pedagogy of
instrumental music and for theoretical and empirical music
research investigating the processes taking place in music-making
and musical listening.
This paper focuses on the extent to which the bodily activity
involved in the acquisition of instrumental skills plays a role
in understanding the forms of one’s own experience that are
supposed to have a structural analogy to the characteristics
of musical sounds that are generated and controlled by one’s
bodily activity (see section “Understanding the Forms of Our
Own Experiences”). Recent embodied approaches to cognition
have led many scholars to re-think the concepts of cognition
as well as the body – the latter regarding the relation between
mind and body, and between body and environment (Gallagher,
2005; Thompson, 2007; Calvo and Gomila, 2008). Tying in
with phenomenological theories of embodied perception and
cognition, this paper attempts to characterize the physical activity
involved in learning music within the context of the acquisition
of instrumental skills as embodied musical activity.
DISCOURSES ON CORPOREALITY AND
EMBODIMENT
The physical activity required to play a musical instrument
is largely refined bodily motor activity – not including the
programming activities used with the computer-as-musical-
instrument (Mathews, 1963) that have recently given rise to and
established a subgenre of computer music called “live coding”
(Collins et al., 2003). What are we doing when we begin to learn
how to play a musical instrument? We attempt to coordinate
appropriate physical energy, corporeal postures and gestures
to generate and control sounds. We often confront physical
difficulties in playing the musical instrument, and develop the
techniques used to overcome them, such as respiration and
fingering techniques. Mastering such basic instrument techniques
is, in general, the first step in the acquisition of instrumental
musical skills. In this stage, the body is often treated as a machine,
closely related to posthumanist visions of “a regulated control,
technical transformation, or even elimination of the body that is
experienced as something defective” (Becker, 2000, p. 22).
But the question of whether a conceptualization of the body as
a thing is appropriate deserves thorough discussion. In discourses
on corporeality carried out in the context of cultural and media
studies in tandem with growing scientific and artistic interest
in corporeal dimensions for some considerable time, the body
is regarded – in line with Western modern thought – either
as a thing or as a construct (List and Fiala, 1997; Barkhaus
and Fleig, 2002). These discourses thus continue to amplify
Cartesian mind-body dualism, according to which an incorporeal
entity – res cogitans – is conceived of as clearly distinguishable
from a corporeal entity – res extensa. When treated as a thing,
the body is changeable and extendable; for example, fitness
discourse revolves around the body’s physical performance,
including its capacity, readiness and improvement, and therefore
centers its mechanical processes. When treated as a construct,
the body is considered a form of appearance accessible to the
senses, as well as representing and making perceptible something
transcending the body. The presence of the body as a construct
serves as a representation of something incorporeal, and at
the same time as a transparent means of making the essential
substance – the being beyond the body (cf. Krämer, 2000) –
accessible to the senses.
Likewise, it is remarkable that the traditional concept of
“embodiment” as semantically related to “incarnation” (Di
Stefano, 2019) – embodiment being an incarnation of a non-
physical substance or the instantiation of an abstract substance
that is supposed to be beyond and prior to the body – is largely
in line with Cartesian mind-body dualism (Seifert and Kim,
2012). In this semantic variant, “embodiment,” characterized as a
dualist concept of embodiment in the sense of “embodiment of”
(Seifert and Kim, 2012, p. 84), refers to both the processuality that
realizing, materializing and concretizing a non-bodily substance
implies through the nomen actionis, and the result thereof.
The processuality of an action is only related to corporeal
processes that obtain a secondary and subsequent status. In other
words: a two-world ontology is presupposed, incorporating a
transcendental world that can be made available subsequently
through its appearance and a world of experience that makes
the former appear, and therefore makes it available (cf. Krämer,
2000). For instance, several research programs in cognitive
robotics pursue an embodied approach in the sense that the
studies of human abstract cognition involve corporeal processes
concretely realizing cognitive capacities. A concrete example
provided by the cognitive scientists and roboticists Rolf Pfeifer
and Christian Scheier is the designing of “a module for wall-
following within the agent” to achieve wall-following behavior, as
opposed to designing “basic processes that together, interacting
with the environment, engender this desired behavior” (Pfeifer
and Scheier, 1999, p. 307). This means that research programs
within cognitive science using a robot could be based on the
notion of the “sense-think-act-cycle” (Clark, 2016, p. 176), and
thus fail to scrutinize an epistemological and ontological dualism.
That being said, a radical transformation of thinking about
the relation of the mind and the body has already begun,
allowing for the establishment of a non-dualist concept of
“embodiment” that can be characterized as “being embodied”
instead of “embodiment of” (Seifert and Kim, 2012, p. 85). The
embodied mind is regarded as a starting state, rather than a
final state resulting from a process embodying an immaterial
substance. More precisely, a state once conceived of as the
result of a process – and that process having been understood
as goal-directed – is considered to constitute a unity (cf.
Seifert and Kim, 2012, p. 85). This is related to the concept
of entelechy developed in Aristotle’s philosophy. Actuality
(Greek: ε´νε´ργεια˘, energeia; Latin: actus/actualitas), the process of
achieving a goal, is distinguished from the potentiality (Greek:
δ να˘µı˘ς, dunamis; Latin: potentia/possibilitas) of achieving a
goal. Aristotle uses the term “entelechy” (Greek: ’εντελε´χεια,
entelecheia; Latin: actualitas) to refer to actualization in general,
the actuality resulting from actualization, or perfection of
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something in particular, as opposed to its mere potentiality;
there is no separation between the goal (Greek: τε´λoς,
telos) to be achieved, the achieved goal or function (Greek:
’´εργoν, ergon), and the process of achieving the goal (Greek:
ε´νε´ργε´ια˘, energeia). As such, the function to be achieved (e.g.,
percept; Greek: α’ıσθητòν, aisthêton), the function achieved
(e.g., perception as the mental function; Greek: α’íσθηµα,
aisthêma) and the process of achieving the goal (e.g., the act
or process of perception; Greek: α’íσθησı˘ς, esthesis) become
unified (cf. Seifert and Kim, 2007, p. 933f.). A non-dualist
concept of “embodiment” can be best understood in this
sense of entelechy.
The most important contributions to a new conceptualization
of embodiment emerged from third-generation approaches
in cognitive science after cognitivist and connectionist ones:
“embodied cognition” (Clark, 1997, 2016), “embodied cognitive
science” (Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999; Pfeifer and Bongard, 2007),
“situated cognition” (Clancey, 1997; Robbins and Aydede,
2009), “interactionism” (Agre and Rosenschein, 1996; Agre,
1997), “interactivism” (Bickhard and Terveen, 1995), and
enactivism (Varela et al., 1991; Hutto and Myin, 2013)
among them (see for an overview Calvo and Gomila, 2008).
They depart from the cognitivist/connectionist presupposition
of a two-world ontology incorporating “a pregiven outer
world” to be recovered and “a pregiven inner world” to be
projected (Varela et al., 1991, p. 172) and focus on (1) the
coupling of action and perception, i.e., motor and sensory
processes and (2) the coupling of agent and environment.
In other words, sensorimotor interactions serve as a basis
for embodied cognition. Furthermore, embodiment necessarily
implies situatedness. This means that a picture of embodied
activity is dependent on the situation in which that activity
occurs – in the case of embodied cognition, “relatively
local” (Robbins and Aydede, 2009, p. 3). Therefore, cognition
is not decoupled from its environment, and thus from
the environment’s affordances or constraints. Approaches to
embodiment and situatedness in cognitive science, especially
in artificial intelligence, are necessarily closely connected with
robotics, in which not only the physical body itself, but
also the embodied and situated interaction of an agent with
its environment – including other agents within it – is
foregrounded (Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999; Pfeifer and Bongard,
2007). In this context, “embodiment” is defined by the roboticists
Dautenhahn et al. (2002) as founded on the functional relation
between the system and its environment, rather than as a
feature of a cognitive system situated in an environment
(Dautenhahn et al., 2002, p. 400).
BODILY ACTIVITY IN
PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORIES OF
EMBODIED PERCEPTION AND
COGNITION
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception
is one of the main reference points in contemporary
discourse on embodiment, used in cognitive science as a
philosophical framework to tackle the issue of embodiment.
In contrast to intellectualism and empiricism, Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology insists that “[w]e must rediscover,
as anterior to the ideas of subject and object, the fact of my
subjectivity and the nascent object, that primordial layer at
which both things and ideas come into being” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962 [1945], p. 219). Going beyond the separation
of subject and object, he discusses the distinctions between
inside and outside, between consciousness and nature, and
between mind and body.
Merleau-Ponty’s La structure du comportement (1942) and
Phénoménologie de la perception (1945) examine the natures
of behavior and perception in the relationship between the
organism and its milieu, which are based on circular, not linear,
causality (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1963 [1942], p. 15). John Wild’s
preface to the English edition of La structure du comportement
(1942) summarizes Merleau-Ponty’s point that human behavior
is “neither a series of blind reactions to external “stimuli,” nor
the projection of acts which are motivated by the pure ideas of a
disembodied, worldless mind. It is neither exclusively subjective
nor exclusively objective, but a dialectical interchange between
man and the world, which cannot be adequately expressed in
traditional causal terms” (Wild, 1963, p. xiv). For Merleau-
Ponty, there is no transcendental ego that is independent of the
dimension of the acting body in space and time (cf. Merleau-
Ponty, 1963 [1942]). Accordingly, he understands perception
as a mode of access to the world. Likewise, his investigation
of the structures of perception is based on a theory of the
body, with which he wants to do away with the ideas of
a separation between res extensa and res cogitans, as well
as of inside and outside. Where classical psychology and
physiology treats the body purely as an object that can be
observed, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes the body proper (“le
corps propre”) as a source of the entire world in which it is
anchored, which cannot be observed from an external position
(cf. Wild, 1963, p. xv).
Here, the site of perception is the body, considered to be an
empirical ego, and it cannot be described with the matrix of
“subjective” vs. “objective”: “I am my body, at least wholly to the
extent that I possess experience, and yet at the same time my body
is as it were a “natural” subject, a provisional sketch of my total
being. Thus experience of one’s own body runs counter to the
reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each
other, and which gives us only the thought about the body, or the
body as an idea, and not the experience of the body or the body
in reality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962 [1945], p. 198f.). The relation
between the body and physical objects is not causal; it can rather
be described as an “intentional arc” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962 [1945],
p. 157) within which the body and its milieu are interdependent.
The body is therefore a decisive moment in the constitution of
an objective world. Events exist only within the milieu of physical
behavior and perceptual situations. There are no “blind reactions”
(Wild, 1963, p. xiv) to physical facts that are outside an organism.
Merleau-Ponty’s theory grounds the stability of perception not
in the capacity of consciousness, but in physical habitual actions –
such as playing musical instruments – which precede the
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emergence of cognition. These repeated bodily actions – which he
calls habitus, and which can be learned on the basis of imitation –
are not merely mechanical processes, but forms of knowledge.
The body functions as a means of communication with the
world, exemplified by the relation between touching and being
touched. Merleau-Ponty calls this “double sensations,” by which
he means that, when one hand touches another, the transition
from one function to another takes place; the hand that is being
touched can also be a hand that touches (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1962
[1945], p. 118f.). The relation between the act of perception and
the perceived object, i.e., inside and outside, is captured as an
inseparable, chiastic relation: “The world is wholly inside and I
am wholly outside myself ” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962 [1945], p. 401).
The German media theorist Barbara Becker highlights this
kind of dynamic interaction with the world while investigating
the concept of a body that serves neither as thing nor construct,
but is considered to be embodied and situated within the world
and entering into a dynamic interaction with the world. Taking
up the phenomenology-minded philosophical tradition, Becker
characterizes this interaction as the chiasmus of action and
passion (Becker, 2000): “We touch and are touched: we act, and
all the while our body responds to the silent offers coming from
the respective environments we’re in, and from the world around
us. And this counterpart is also always acting and reacting in us”
(Becker, 2000, p. 44).
CHIASMUS OF ACTION AND PASSION
RELATED TO A DYNAMIC INTERACTION
WITH THE MUSICAL INSTRUMENT
What role does this chiasmus of action and passion play in the
embodied activity involved in the acquisition of instrumental
musical skills? When we encounter a new musical instrument,
whether mechanical or digital, its physical or virtual materiality
offers resistance; this allows us to engage in a dynamic interaction
with the musical instrument, during which we act and react in
relation to its materiality. Typically, we begin this interaction in
the role of a “patient” – i.e., one being affected by an agent, to
apply the anthropologist Alfred Gell’s term (Gell, 1998). During
the time we are learning how to engage with it, the musical
instrument becomes a primary locus of agency, permeating our
actions and intentions – which can thus be regarded as “affected.”
There is a stage in the acquisition of instrumental musical skills
wherein that agency is manifested, allowing the “patient” to shift
to acting as an “agent” (Gell, 1998, p. 22).
The acquisition of instrumental musical skills is accompanied
by the process of oscillation between affecting and being
affected – “action and passion” – e.g., motor command based
on auditory and tactile information. Through this oscillation,
we develop resistance to the instrument’s materiality, and at the
same time we establish direct tangible contact with the musical
world that is created and shaped by this embodied musical
activity. In this sense, such embodied musical activity can be
conceived of as joined with the musical instrument, and the
musical sounds being generated and shaped dynamically. In turn,
the embodied activity gives rise to the pre-reflective bodily sense,
which is accompanied by a double feedback loop consisting of
auditory and kinesthetic/tactile feedback (Leman, 2007; Kim,
2010). For instance, we become used to the vibrotactile feedback
of the musical instrument’s resonator through direct bodily
contact or proximity; as a result, we attain bodily feelings while
playing a musical instrument. We also learn instrumental musical
skills using techniques that are appropriate to the controller
(a keyboard, string, reed, etc.). Instrumental skills that are
acquired are therefore closely related to the bodily techniques
afforded and constrained by each musical instrument’s controller.
A change in the controller’s characteristics – such as the material
a string is made of, or resistance pressing a key – gives rise
to an adjustment or new strategy of bodily techniques relying
on our bodily sense, which, in routine embodied activity,
remains pre-reflective.
This kind of pre-reflective bodily sense becomes aware if,
and only if, our attention is directed toward the proximal, to
apply Michael Polanyi’s term (Polanyi, 1966) – for instance, the
bodily state while using bodily movements dependent on the
various physical characteristics of the controller of the musical
instrument, and/or a specific characteristic of the musical sounds
generated and controlled by that instrument. While learning
to play a musical instrument, we generally start in a state
in which the proximal becomes the foreground; through the
acquisition of instrumental musical skills, we eventually attain
a state in which the proximal recedes into the background.
This allows us to direct our attention to the distal – those
qualities of musical sounds and the melodic and rhythmic
structure of music shaped by bodily activity – in shaping
musical sounds in a refined way and combining sound sequences
with one another.
In his seminal work The Tacit Dimension (1966), Polanyi
discusses the proximal and the distal, respectively, as the
phenomenal and functional structure of what he refers to as
“tacit knowing”; he coined this term to describe the ways
in which we are subsidiarily aware of cranial processes (cf.
Polanyi, 1966, p. xix), “as if they were part of our body”
(Polanyi, 1966, p. xviii). His main claim is that cranial
processes related to cognitive actions become meaningful if
the transposition of spontaneously indwelling bodily experience
(the proximal) into the perception of things outside (the distal)
takes place (cf. Polanyi, 1966, p. 14 f.). How the proximal
and the distal are combined to capture the meaningfulness
of embodied musical activity involved in the acquisition
of instrumental skills will be discussed in the following
section, taking up concepts of body image and body schema
recently discussed in the context of cognitive (neuro)science
and phenomenology.
OSCILLATIONS BETWEEN BODY IMAGE
AND BODY SCHEMA IN THE
ACQUISITION OF INSTRUMENTAL
MUSICAL SKILLS
When learning to play a new musical instrument, we try
to generate and control a musical sound that has a specific
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characteristic according to each instrument – such as timbre
and vibrato – and to present sound sequences and to combine
sound sequences to one another. The goal of acquiring
instrumental musical skills could therefore be considered as
musically meaningful activity guided by a shift of attention
from the proximal toward the distal. This activity could
also be understood in terms of recent theories of body
schema and body image.
The body schema that Merleau-Ponty discusses is a system
of sensory-motor capacities underlying habitual bodily actions.
The system is integrated into extraintentional operations
carried out prior to or outside of intentional awareness of
one’s own body. The latter occurs “in terms of monitoring or
directing perceptual attention to limb position, movement,
posture, pleasure, pain, kinaesthetic experience, and so on
[. . .]” (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, p. 146); through an
intentional operation of consciousness that constitutes aspects
of a body image (Krois, 2011), the body becomes the content
of consciousness. By contrast, body-schematic processes are
characterized as “sensorimotor functions” (Gallagher and
Zahavi, 2008, p. 146), operating “below the level of self-
referential intentionality” (Gallagher, 1995, p. 228) involving
pre-reflective awareness of our bodily movements and postures,
rather than objectifying body-awareness (Gallagher, 2005,
p. 24f.; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, p. 146), conscious bodily
self-perception (Krois, 2011, p. 258) or a conceptual model of
the body (Gallagher, 2005, p. 32). As such, body schema and
body image can be distinguished from one another. However,
body-schematic processes are conceived of as a basis for an
intentional operation of conscious experience; the manifold
aspects of sense-perceptible appearances of one’s own body
are only unified based on the body schema so as to result in a
complex body image (cf. Krois, 2011, p. 258).
The status of the body schema and body image oscillates
during certain bodily activities, such as those devoted to the
acquisition of instrumental musical skills. The first stage of
learning a new musical instrument involves intentional action,
for which we have novel modes of engagement with the
world. At this stage, our body schema – which, for habitual
actions, would function without conscious representations –
needs to be reoriented. While the musical instrument remains
opaque, and thus requires our attention toward the proximal,
i.e., perceptions and feelings of the body, the process of
monitoring of our instrumental musical skills takes place,
which renders the body objectified. In other words, the
body image is constituted while engaging in non-habitual
actions; although the bodily states that we are aware of
cannot be verbalized explicitly in this stage, we have conscious
experience of those states. In an advanced stage, where
the necessary instrumental techniques have been mastered,
we reach the status of habitual bodily action, and the
musical instrument becomes transparent (Jaeger and Kim,
2008; Nijs et al., 2013; Schiavio and De Jaegher, 2017).
As a result, body image recedes into the background and
we have pre-reflective, non-objectifying body-awareness. At
this stage, our attention is shifted from the proximal (our
bodily states) toward the distal (for instance, to the melodic
and harmonic structure of the music shaped through our
embodied activity).
RELATIONS OF BODILY GESTURES TO
THE DISTAL
In paying attention to the distal, we are not only concerned with
the qualities of single sounds, but also with a unity of music –
such as the melodic and rhythmic structure, in which sound
sequences are merged by virtue of their relation to one another. In
shaping such a melodic and rhythmic structure, we are preparing
the next sound – in terms of physical energy, corporeal postures
and gestures – directly related to the sound occurring in now-
moments. These corporeal postures and gestures include both
those used while closing the sound that has almost passed, and
those that prepare for applying a further instrumental technique
to generate and control the next sound – all until the last sound of
a unity of music has been created and shaped (Kim et al., 2010).
Such micro-gestures used in the context of musical performance
can be empirically investigated, most effectively by a high-speed
camera or a motion-capture device (ibid.).
A possible mechanism underlying such musical structuring
related to the now-moments might be what Mark Reybrouck
characterizes as “in-time music” processing (Reybrouck, 2017),
which takes place within “the moment-to-moment history of
successive acts of focal attention” (Reybrouck, 2017, p. 89). This
seems compatible with the Husserlian concepts of the primary
memory and primal impression (Husserl, 1991 [1966]) that allow
for extension of presence in regards to what has passed in now-
moments (retention) and what will follow in now-moments
(protention). Moreover, a growing body of research on the
bodily gestures used in musical performance shows that corporeal
macro-gestures are also used in shaping a musical unity. Tying
in with David McNeill’s research on language-accompanying
gesture (McNeill, 1992), such gestures include those that McNeill
refers to as “iconic gestures” sharing a musically meaningful
aspect – e.g., gestures imitating melodic or dynamic contour –
or “beat gestures” emphasizing selected musical elements, serving
to organize sound sequences as musical structure rather than
conveying information related to musical meaning. In particular,
those gestures accompanying bodily activity involved in the
generation and control of musical sounds often exhibit a close
relation to the characteristics of the related perceptible musical
sounds – both of singular sounds and sound sequences that are
experienced as a unity (Godøy and Leman, 2009). This kind of
shaping of a musical unity could involve what Husserl calls “the
secondary memory” (Husserl, 1991 [1966]), which goes beyond
the extended presence, and is related to intermediate-term rather
than short-term memory and working memory.
Often, such gestures are used involuntarily in the context of
musical performance when our attention is directed toward the
distal. There are, however, cases in which corporeal gestures share
characteristics with the musical sounds generated and controlled
by a musical instrument. In traditional South Indian (Karnatak)
music, such gestures are part of instrumental education, used to
help players imagine the characteristics of sounds and the musical
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structure – especially the svaras (scale degrees of a raga) – to
be shaped (Pearson, 2016). Likewise, a Korean musical tradition
observes a similar practice, albeit the other way around: The
first step in learning to play a musical instrument is learning to
produce typical instrumental sounds and rhythmic structures by
“singing” sounds, allowing for embodiment of essential musical
characteristics such as duration, contour and tension/relaxation
in terms of imitation. The acquisition of instrumental body
techniques follows, using the voice to imitate instrumental
sounds, provided that the instrumental techniques are mastered
in relation to the qualities of musical sounds and structures of
music. Techniques imitating the characteristics of musical sounds
that can be generated and controlled by a musical instrument,
through the help of another medium, are considered embodied
techniques allowing for maintenance of attention to the distal.
UNDERSTANDING THE FORMS OF OUR
OWN EXPERIENCES
In an advanced stage of the acquisition of instrumental musical
skills, in which the body image does not play a significant role,
the large-scale structure of music is shaped in a very refined
manner – both in terms of the qualities of the musical sounds and
the structuring unities of musical experience. Often accompanied
by the flow of bodily gestures, performing a musical piece allows
the player immersion into the musical world that is created
by embodied activity. According to the philosopher Susanne
K. Langer, this world has a structural analogy to the world of
human feeling:
“The tonal structure we call “music” bears a close logical similarity
to the forms of human feeling – form of growth and attenuation,
flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific
excitement, calm or subtle activation and dreamy lapses – not joy
and sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy of either and both – the
greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt”
(Langer, 1953, p. 27).
Langer’s unusual concept, encompassing all aspects of human
vitality, is akin to our pre-reflective feelings in the world, which
the contemporary philosopher Matthew Ratcliffe refers to as
“existential feelings.” Existential feelings are concerned with
bodily feelings; according to Ratcliffe, however, they are not just
feelings of internal bodily states, but rather “ways of finding
ourselves in a world, existential backgrounds that shape all
our experiences” (Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 47). The musical structure
exhibits forms of vitality (Stern, 2010), dynamic forms of a
sentient being’s behavior in relation to others. Although music
is not a sentient being, forms of vitality are assigned to a musical
expressive Gestalt (Stern, 2010; Kim, 2013), which is considered
to both result from the intra-musical relation (combination of
musical elements with one another), and be related to the world
and other people.
Shaping the musical structure, with the involvement of
embodied activity, can make our pre-reflective feelings in the
world reflective, in such a way that the forms of vitality unfolding
in the world of human feeling are co-shaped while shaping the
forms of vitality situated in the musical world. This state of
shaping and co-shaping forms of vitality (Kim, 2013) through
musical embodied activity is achieved in an advanced stage of
learning how to play a musical instrument. The shift of our
attention of the proximal to the distal while playing a musical
instrument therefore does not simply mean that we attend to
things external from things internal. Much more than that, it
allows us to direct our attention to our being-in-the-world,
dissolving a dichotomy between inner and outer.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, the bodily activity involved in the acquisition
of instrumental skills was regarded not only as the process of
learning instrumental skills related to a given musical instrument,
but also that of learning musical skills and experiencing music
itself. In line with phenomenological theories of embodied
perception and cognition, the body was conceptualized neither
as thing nor construct (List and Fiala, 1997; Barkhaus and
Fleig, 2002), but as embodied being (Seifert and Kim, 2012).
The initial thesis held that the body could also have a status
of patient – according to Gell’s theory of agency – who
suffers from the material resistance of a musical instrument
relying on its materiality, whether physical (in the case of
mechanical musical instruments) or virtual (in the case of digital
musical instruments).
The extent to which the embodied musical activity that
is directed toward learning instrumental musical skills,
accompanied by the chiasmus of action and passion, was
discussed, making clear that the process of oscillation between
body image and body schema allows humans to acquire
instrumental musical skills such an embodied way that they can
attend from their bodily states – the proximal – to the qualities
of musical sounds and the melodic and rhythmic structure
of music that are shaped by their bodily activity – the distal.
Such an embodied knowledge of those skills was considered
manifest in bodily gestures, which prove to be both instrumental
and related to musical properties – e.g., musical contour and
tension/relaxation – in a non-causal and meaningful way. In
turn, the extent to which the forms of one’s own experience
are understood while the musical world is created by one’s
bodily activity was examined. Tying in with Langer’s theory
of music as a form of human feeling and Ratcliffe’s concept
of existential feelings, it was argued that the characteristics
of musical sounds that are experienced – as related to bodily
gestures accompanying embodied activity involved in the
generation and control of musical sounds – allow us to make
our pre-reflective feelings in the world – “existential feelings” –
reflective. This claim is in line with Langer’s theory of music as a
form of human feeling and Stern’s concept of forms of vitality;
these make clear that the pre-reflective forms of feelings in the
world have a structural analogy to the qualities of musical sounds
and the melodic and rhythmic structure of music that are shaped
in a relational interaction with the world.
Playing a musical instrument can therefore be conceived of as
an effective means to understand the forms of our own experience
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in relation to the musical world: it serves as musical worldmaking.
Moreover, as recent theories of embodied music cognition
of music support the thesis that covert gestures (“inner
gestures”) and/or overt gestures (such as dancing) accompany
the process of musical listening (Leman, 2007; Cox, 2016), it
can be claimed that music perception, during musical listening,
aids in understanding the forms of our own experience as
related to the world. In other words, music perception can be
characterized as a process of co-shaping the forms of human
feeling or forms of vitality embodied in music (Stern, 2010;
Kim, 2013), and thus of providing access to our existential
feelings. The acquisition of instrumental musical skills that
allows us to shape musical sounds and structure music, in
tandem with our bodily (partially very refined) activity, could
therefore enhance not only our sensorimotor capabilities, but
also our capacity for relating our own experience to the
world and others.
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